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On the Historical Roots of the Modern Welfare State: 
The Knappschaft Statistics of 1861 to 1920 as a 
Source for Quantitative Historical Social Research 
Tobias A. Jopp ∗ 
Abstract: »Zu den historischen Wurzeln des modernen Wohlfahrtsstaates: Die 
Knappschaftsstatistiken der Jahre 1861 bis 1920 als Quelle quantitativer his-
torischer Sozialforschung«. This article introduces the Knappschaft statistics as 
a basic source for quantitative data on a very important topic in historical so-
cial research, namely the rise of the welfare state. Scholars who seek to embark 
upon historical social research in that direction require both qualitative and 
quantitative data. Exploring data sources and making data available for general 
use thus is crucial to systematic research and scholarly discourse. For the period 
1861 to 1920, the Knappschaft statistics document the operation of the vari-
ous German Knappschaftsvereine as the carriers of miners’ occupational social 
insurance at the time. Data on the various Knappschaften are quite rich ena-
bling us to use them as a “historical laboratory” not merely to study the welfare 
positions of and social relations in a particular societal class in a particular pe-
riod, but to explore more general questions related to the roots of modern wel-
fare states, their functioning, and the challenges they face. To stress this point, 
I combine the concise overview of the Knappschaft statistics with a straight-
forward application to the question of the consequences of aging in a pay-as-
you-go pension system. 
Keywords: aging, Knappschaft, pension level, Prussia, social insurance, statis-
tics, welfare state. 
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1.  Introduction 
Scholars who seek to embark upon historical social research require both quali-
tative and quantitative data. Exploring data sources and making data available 
for general use thus is crucial to systematic research and scholarly discourse. In 
this regard, this article’s intention is to introduce the Knappschaft statistics as a 
basic, yet less known, source for quantitative data on a very important topic in 
historical social research, namely the rise of the welfare state and its basic 
challenges. 
Several statistics frameworks were systematically compiled between 1861 
and 1920 to document the operation of the various German Knappschaftsver-
eine (“KVs” in the following) as carriers of miners’ occupational social insur-
ance. These miners’ relief societies trace their roots some 750 years back when 
they originally emerged as religious and charitable brotherhoods of the medi-
aeval miners of the Harz region and Erz Mountains (both in central Germany). 
Around the middle of the nineteenth century, KVs existed in many German 
states, where mining of coal or ore existed; among those states, Bavaria, Prus-
sia and Saxony were the most important ones in terms of the number of operat-
ing KVs, as well as in terms of the number of covered miners. It was especially 
around this time that the KVs were re-defined as what might be called the 
earliest historical example of a social insurance scheme insuring participants 
against income losses due to invalidity (lasting incapacitation for work), survi-
vorship, and sickness (temporary incapacitation for work). Conventional wis-
dom links up this kind of collective provision against fundamental life risks 
with Bismarckian worker insurance introduced between 1883 and 1889. In fact, 
the KVs had already been based on principles commonly associated with social 
insurance – mandatory contributions by employees and employers, joint self-
government of both parties, and the existence of an implicit generational con-
tract – before, and anticipated the major principles of Bismarck’s system 
(Tampke 1982). 
As we shall see below, data on the various KVs are quite rich enabling us to 
use the KVs as a “historical laboratory” not merely to study the welfare posi-
tions of and social relations in a particular societal class in a particular period, 
but to explore more general questions related to the roots of modern welfare 
states, their functioning, and the challenges they face. To stress this point, I 
combine the concise overview of the Knappschaft statistics with a straightfor-
ward application to the question of the consequences of aging in a pay-as-you-
go pension system.1 Prussian, but also Bavarian KVs were financed that way. 
In combination with the fact that among the main benefits offered were pen-
                                                             
1  For a discussion of the set of problems, exemplarily see Cutler et al. (1990), Schmähl (2001), 
and Börsch-Supan and Ludwig (2010). 
HSR 38 (2013) 1  │  313 
sions to invalids, widows and orphans, this is the necessary pre-condition for 
preparing an experience report out of history on that topic. Moreover, the KVs’ 
history shows that they clearly were subject to aging over time.2  
This article mainly adds to two strongly interrelated fields of research: (i) 
the historical literature on the rise of the welfare state(s) and (ii) the historical 
literature especially on the long-term relationship between population aging 
and the financing of pension and health care programs. Recent as well as clas-
sic contributions to the former include, for example, Mommsen (1981), Hen-
nock (1982, 1987, 1990, 2007), Lindert (1994), Eghigian (2000), Flora and 
Heidenheimer (2003), Gladstone (2008), Nijhof (2009), Companje et al. 
(2009), Ritter (2010), Reimat (2012), and Harris (2012). Making use of histori-
cal data, Cutler and Johnson (2004), in particular, test conflicting hypotheses 
on why the “social insurance state” emerged (such as the “Leviathan theory”, 
the “demographic heterogeneity theory”, or the “political legitimacy theory”). 
Studies regarding the latter strand of literature include, for example, Johnson 
(1984), Diebolt and Reimat (1997), Hardach (2003), Pearson (2003). Comple-
mentary to the studies mentioned above, Guinnane (2011) and Galor (2012) 
provide recent insights into the “demographic transition” as the transition from 
high to low fertility and, respectively, low to high life expectancy. Due to the 
KVs’ nature as occupational and (kind of) mutual insurers, this article also 
links up with, for example, Hannah (1986), who investigates the emergence of 
occupational pensions in Britain, and the body of literature on mutual relief 
societies outside Germany (e.g., Beito 2000; Emery and Emery 1999; Murray 
2006; Van der Linden 1996). 
The article proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the Knappschaft statis-
tics covering the formative period of the German welfare state, 1861-1920. The 
prime focus lies on the statistics on Prussian KVs, but the ones on Bavarian and 
Saxon KVs are briefly touched as well. Section 3 outlines how part of the data 
may be applied to assess the KVs’ experience with aging memberships. Section 
4 concludes the paper. 
                                                             
2  This article cannot give a comprehensive account of the KVs’ economic history in the second 
half of the nineteenth and the early twentieth century, and, in particular, not of the struc-
ture and style of KVs. A body of literature has recently emerged answering such principle 
questions as to “how did the KVs work?” or “what was the typical insurance contract like?” 
(Guinnane and Streb 2011; Guinnane, Jopp and Streb 2012; Jopp 2011a, 2011b, 2012). For 
more detailed information on the KVs, one may consult this literature.  
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2.  The Knappschaft Statistics – A Description 
2.1  The Relatively Best-Documented Case: Prussian 
Knappschaften 
Basically, there are three reasons why we should focus on Prussian KVs in the 
first instance: To start with, the Prussian KVs were the first ones to be trans-
formed into social insurance providers formally acting on behalf of the gov-
ernment. This happened during the Prussian mining reform of 1851-1865. All 
German states that committed themselves to the Prussian tradition of mining 
sector regulation imitated the Prussian General Mining Law of 1865, including 
the paragraphs on how to regulate KVs (e.g., Bavaria in 1869); there were only 
few states that committed themselves to the different regulatory tradition of the 
Kingdom of Saxony. Insofar, willingly or unwillingly, Prussia set the standard. 
Secondly, as of the middle of the nineteenth century, Prussia had emerged as 
the German core mining region with KVs located there accounting for around 
90 percent of all German miners; this share remained stable over the whole 
period under consideration. Thirdly, the Prussian Knappschaft statistics show 
the comparatively highest degree of informational detail as measured by the 
number of different variables reported. 
The Prussian Knappschaft statistics, officially entitled the Statistik der 
Knappschaftsvereine des preussischen Staates, had been compiled and edited 
the first time in 1855 by Rudolf von Carnall, with permission of the Prussian 
Department of Mining, Metallurgy and Salines (Ministerial-Abtheilung für 
Berg-, Hütten- und Salinenwesen). He edited four further volumes (von Carnall 
1854-1858). These, as well as all subsequent ones, were published as part of 
the Zeitschrift für das Berg-, Hütten- und Salinenwesen in dem preussischen 
Staate. Of those initial five volumes, only the first reports data on the individu-
al KV-level for the year 1852, when the KVs were not yet reformed, but still 
subordinated under the so-called direction principle, which had once installed 
the mercantilist state’s bureaucracy as the sole authority running miners’ funds 
(Jopp 2012b, 44-5). From 1859 on, the Knappschaft statistics were compiled 
and edited by three administrative bodies, namely the Prussian Ministry of 
Trade, Commerce and Public Works (Ministerium für Handel, Gewerbe und 
öffentliche Arbeiten 1859-1878), the Prussian Ministry of Public Works (Minis-
terium für öffentliche Arbeiten 1879-1889) as a spin-off of the former, and, 
respectively, the Prussian Ministry of Trade and Commerce (Ministerium für 
Handel und Gewerbe 1890-1922). Compiled were the business reports that 
KVs were obliged to prepare and forward to the administration. In fact, all 
volumes issued since 1862, when post-reform KV-level data were reported the 
first time, are employable for systematic quantitative research; each volume 
reports data on the preceding year.  
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The appeal of the Prussian KV statistics basically stems from the fact that it 
explicitly reports data on many aspects of miners’ funds’ operations (such as 
membership composition and financing streams) on the KV-level, and not 
merely on the aggregate. To the best of my knowledge, comparably extensive 
statistical frameworks addressing, say, all the sickness relief and other relief 
funds that came into existence after 1845, when the Prussian Industrial Code 
(Gewerbeordnung) was enacted, or after 1854, when the Law on Industrial 
Provident funds (Gesetz betreffend die gewerblichen Unterstützungskassen) 
came into being, are not available.  
Structurally, we can order the data reported on the KV-level according to 
three main “reporting instruments”, namely a KV’s “profit and loss statement”, 
a KV’s “asset balance”, and a KV’s “membership balance”; the following three 
sub-sections will go through these instruments. Within each of these three 
problem areas data are ordered according to the spatial structure of KVs. In all, 
103 different KVs operated in Prussia over the period 1861-1920. Each KV 
was located in one of five different so-called Oberbergamtsbezirke (mining 
administration regions), named after the cities, where the offices were: Bonn 
(comprising the Saar and Aachen coal-fields), Breslau (comprising the Upper 
and Lower Silesian coal-fields), Clausthal (comprising the Harz coal- and ore-
fields), Dortmund (comprising the Ruhr coal-fields), and Halle (comprising 
part of the important Saxon coal- and ore-fields). These mining administration 
regions, of which we will find complements in Bavaria and Saxony, were the 
administrative fundament of Prussian mine regulation. They should not be 
confused with general governmental districts (Regierungsbezirke), though. 
2.1.1  Profit and Loss Statement 
What I call the KVs’ “profit and loss statement” should, actually, not be re-
garded as a statement complying with formal accounting standards. Reported 
for each KV are revenue items on the one hand and expenditure items on the 
other. Table 1 provides an overview of those items. I encoded main revenue 
categories by “R1” to “R5” and main expenditure categories by “E1” to “E6”.  
Before taking a closer look at the respective items, some peculiarities should 
be addressed regarding the way data are presented in the statistics: Firstly, all 
monetary figures are denominated in Prussian thaler until 1874 and in mark 
thereafter. Secondly, until 1907, a couple of items were separately reported for 
two basic categories of membership, namely for the so-called “established” and 
“unestablished” miners (ständige and unständige Bergleute). Originally, this 
distinction, which not every KV knew, had been created to separate full-time 
workers (established) from part-time workers (unestablished); the former were 
equipped with more rights such as access to a more extensive benefit package 
(in terms of the sheer amount as well as the different sorts of benefits) or more 
voting rights. Since regulations prescribed compulsory membership, and thus 
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forced a KV into contracting with every miner who was employed in its respec-
tive insurance area, this distinction might have been some kind of risk policy 
instrument, but not an instrument to exclude miners from membership at all. 
This is because KVs usually specified that those who wanted to become an 
established miner were to meet certain criteria (e.g., be of age 20/25 to 40/45; 
be of moral integrity; be of good, certified health). Every miner who did not 
meet those criteria was classified unestablished. This distinction, claimed un-
just by many a workers’ representative, was no longer retained after 1907. 
Thirdly, the same regulatory reform that abolished the opportunity of discrimi-
nation introduced an accounting separation, too. While, until 1907, KVs had 
been running a kind of compound insurance scheme, in which exactly one 
contribution payment was charged per miner for the whole package of invalidi-
ty, survivorship and health-related benefits, they were required to run their 
pension and sickness insurance sections as if they were two self-standing busi-
nesses from then on. As a consequence, we find that starting in 1908 revenues, 
expenditures, assets and memberships were separately reported for the pension 
and the sickness insurance sections. Fourthly, and finally, there are obvious 
reporting inconsistencies. Some variables were not reported over the full ob-
servation period, or the degree of detail changed here and there.  
Along with each item, such as “contributions by employers”, some addition-
al information is given in the table: on the hand, the run time of each variable 
(e.g., reported over the period 1861 to 1866, or “1861/66”) and, on the other 
hand, whether the respective item was only relevant, after 1907, for the pension 
insurance section or, respectively, for the sickness insurance section as indicat-
ed by a superscript “a” or “b”. If not indicated this way, the variable is reported 
for both sections.  
Now let us take a look at revenues and expenditures. KVs evidently relied 
on several income sources. First, and most importantly, there were social insur-
ance contributions by miners and their employers (R1.1 to R1.7), usually 
charged as a fixed amount per capita (and, maybe, per class of seniority and 
income); if we explored the data in more depth, we would find that contribu-
tions usually accounted for 75 to 90 percent of a KV’s income.  
Furthermore, there were some sorts of fees to be paid (R2.1 to R2.4). One 
fee was linked with the act of joining a KV; a second was due as corrective 
measure in case of misbehavior; and a third was due if a miner married; his KV 
would then have processed administrative affairs. What I translate with 
“acknowledgement fees” (Anerkennungsgebühren) were a means for an insur-
ant who faced an interruption of employment to keep up entitlements he had 
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already accumulated; in other words, paying those fees instead of regular con-
tributions did not mean to earn incremental entitlements on top.3  
Table 1: Schematic Profit and Loss Statement 
Revenues Expenditures 
(R1) Contributions (E1) Pension benefits 
(R1.1) By established miners (1861/88) (E1.1) Semi-invalidity (1861/88) 
(R1.2) By unestablished miners (1861/88) (E1.2) Full invalidity (1861/1920) 
(R1.3) By employers (1861/1920) (E1.3) Surviving widows (1861/1920) 
(R1.4) By miners on leave (1867/88) (E1.4) Surviving orphans (1861/1920) 
(R1.5) By sick miners (1867/88) (E1.5) Widows’ compensation after remar-riagea (1908/20) 
(R1.6) By miners (1889/1920) (E1.6) Miscellaneousa (1908/20) 
(R1.7) Arrearage, preceding year (1908/20) (E2) Health-related benefits 
(R2) Fees (E2.1) Physicians’ salary (1861/1920) 
(R2.1) Marriage fees (1861/66) (E2.2) Medical Treatment (1861/1920) 
(R2.2) Joining fees (1861/1920) (E2.3) Daily sick pay (1861/1907) 
(R2.3) Punishment fees (1861/1907) (E2.4) Sick pay if treated at homeb (1908/20) 
(R2.4) Acknowledgement feesa (1908/20) 
(E2.5) Sick pay if treated in hospital and 
dependants eligible for benefits existb 
(1908/20) 
(R3) Capital income 
(E2.6) Sick pay if treated in hospital and 
dependants eligible for benefits do not existb 
(1908/20) 
(R3.1) Interest (1861/1907) (E2.7) Payments to women in childbed
b 
(1908/20) 
(R3.2) Interest on paper holdings (1908/20) (E2.8) Hospital treatmentb (1908/20) 
(R3.3) Interest on bank deposits (1908/20) (E3) Miscellaneous benefits 
(R3.4) Rent (1861/1907) (E3.1) Funeral pay (1861/1907) 
(R3.5) Net yield from own establishments 
(1909/20) (E3.2) Funeral pay (death of invalid, 1908/20) 
(R4) Other revenue sources (E3.3) Funeral pay (death of dependant, 1908/20) 
(R4.1) Miscellaneous (1861/1920) (E3.4) Extraordinary support (1861/1907) 
(R4.2) Deductions because of wage increases 
(1867/88) (E3.5) Education support (1861/1907) 
(R4.3) Extraordinary sales (1867/1907) (E3.6) Compensation of foreignersa (1908/20) 
(R4.4) Donations (1867/1907) 
 (E4) Operating costs 
(R4.5) Compensation payments by Reich 
insurance carriers and other KVsb (1908/20) (E4.1) Administrative cost (1861/1920)  
(R5) Net deficit (1861/1920) (E4.2) Miscellaneous costs (e.g., hospital construction (1861/1920) 
 (E4.3) Arbitration court usea (1908/20) 
 (E4.4) Maintenance of buildingsa (1908/20) 
 (E4.5) Interest on debt (1909/20) 
                                                             
3  In my opinion, it is likely that “contributions by the ones on leave” (R1.4) were, in essence, 
such acknowledgement fees. Unfortunately, as can be seen, there is a reporting inconsisten-
cy since either variable is not reported for the period 1889 to 1907. 
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Table 1 continued… 
 (E4.6) Taxes (1909/20) 
 (E4.7) Medical examinations before joining the KVa (1909/20) 
 (E5) Refunds to other KVs 
 (E5.1) Invalidity pensionsa (1908/20) 
 (E5.2) Widow’s pensionsa (1908/20) 
 (E5.3) Widows’ compensation after remar-riagea (1908/20) 
 (E6) Net surplus (1861/1920) 
Notes: Quantities measured by 31st December. A superscript “a” denotes items only relevant, 
after 1907, regarding the pension insurance section. A superscript “b” denotes items only 
relevant, after 1907, regarding the sickness insurance section.  
Sources: See text. 
 
Additional income sources were interest on assets, rent, and earnings from own 
establishments, such as hospitals, or some rather irregular revenues such as 
donations and extraordinary sales of assets, e.g., a building (R.3.1 to R4.5).4 Of 
all these miscellaneous items, interest income was relatively most important.  
The expenditure side illustrates quite well the comprehensive benefit pack-
age the KVs offered. Some benefits, such as the three types of pensions for 
invalids and survivors (E1.1 to E1.4) as well as daily sick pay, basic healthcare 
costs, and funeral subsidies (E2.1 to E2.6, and E2.8 and E3.1 to E3.3), had to 
be provided by every KV; remaining benefits, such as “education support” for 
parents (mostly tuition fees) were voluntarily offered. Regarding pensions, 
some KVs distinguished for some time between semi- and full invalidity. 
While the former case went along with being still capable of working as a 
miner, albeit not in the same dangerous position as before, full invalidity meant 
to be incapable, from the perspective of the system, of working as a miner for 
the rest of one’s life; this, however, did not rule out the possibility of earning a 
wage in another sector of the economy, while receiving an invalidity pension 
from a KV. 
Beyond benefit expenditures, the statistics also informs about pure opera-
tional expenses. Until 1907, the statement was badly undifferentiated in that all 
sorts of cost were only reported as either administrative expenses – mainly 
labor costs – or the remainder – mainly maintenance of buildings. After the 
accounting reform, the statement became much more informative, especially 
with regard to the KVs’ pension insurance section.  
What is called “refunds to other KVs” (E5.1 to E5.3) emerged whenever a 
miner had changed his workplace and the KV that insured him, because the 
new workplace was situated in another KV area. However, there had to be a 
                                                             
4  Gathered under “miscellaneous revenues” (R4.1), were, for example, commissions or all items 
that were not consistently reported explicitly over the whole period (e.g., marriage fees af-
ter 1867, or punishment fees after 1908). 
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bilateral contract between two KVs stating that the one KV would settle pen-
sion claims for the time the miner was part of its membership and the other 
would act accordingly.5 
Finally, counting revenues against expenditures, KVs could have either real-
ized a net surplus, which happened more frequently, or a net deficit (R5 and 
E6). Although KVs were not-for-profit organizations, they often charged more 
contributions than were necessary to settle claims. However, since this only 
became clear at the end of the year, ex post, reserves were in fact accumulated 
and ready to be used as a financial buffer in times of trouble.  
2.1.2  Asset Balance 
Let us turn to the KVs’ asset balance as illustrated by Table 2. Analogous to 
what I have done above, I encoded items on the left-hand side – assets – with 
“A” and those on the right-hand side – liabilities – with “L”.  
KVs were definitely equipped with assets. A great many did actually not 
own buildings (A4) themselves, and often KVs did not even report movable 
assets (A5). But almost every KV in almost every year of operation reported 
monetary assets generated from net surpluses in past years.6 The single-most 
important productive investment was interest-bearing assets (A3).7 In compari-
son, the amount of cash holdings, bank deposits and miscellaneous assets (e.g., 
receivables) was rather low.  
There is an asset category – “reinsurance deposit” – that deserves special at-
tention. Recall the regulatory reform of 1906 that led to the abolishment of the 
established/unestablished status and that prescribed the institutional separation 
of pension insurance from health insurance operations. The same reform also 
prescribed a modified pay-as-you-go method to be applied by all KVs, the so-
called Rentenwertumlageverfahren (“present value pay-as-you-go scheme”, 
one might say, versus “current value pay-as-you-go scheme”). In essence, KVs 
were obliged to accumulate reserves so such that all pensions, granted from 
                                                             
5  Note that the bottom line among KVs was that a miner turning over to another KV lost his 
entitlements already accumulated. Actually, this was a problem of portability of entitle-
ments, which was often solved bilaterally, but which was coherently addressed by regula-
tions not before 1907. 
6  At the beginning of each volume, it is reported which type of building a KV owned. For the 
years 1867 to 1907, the statistics reports the number of hospitals, schools (for the miners 
children), and administrative buildings. For the years 1908 to 1920, it reports the number of 
hospitals, infirmaries, pharmacies, schools, orphanages, and administrative buildings. 
7  Unfortunately, the statistics do not report of which type they were. Though, according to 
Jüngst (1913, 266-9), we get to know that the larger KVs usually held a mix of mortgages, 
Prussian government bonds, German Reich bonds, municipal bonds, and other loans. 
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1908 on, would be pre-funded to the amount of their expected duration (i.e., 
their present values) in the same year they were due the first time.8  
Table 2: Schematic Asset Balance 
Assets Liabilities 
(A1) Capital assets (1861/66) (L1) Debt on immovable property (1867/1920) 
(A2) Cash holdings (1867/1920) (L2) Other debt (1867/1920) 
(A3) Interest bearing assets (1867/1920) (L3) Net debt (1867/1920) 
(A4) Immovable property (1867/1920)  
(A5) Movables (1867/1920)  
(A6) Miscellaneous assets (1861/1920)  
(A7) Bank deposits (1908/20)  
(A8) Reinsurance deposita (1908/20)  
(A9) Net assets (1861/1920)  
Notes: Quantities measured by 31st December. A superscript “a” denotes items only relevant, 
after 1907, regarding the pension insurance section. 
Sources: See text. 
 
Formally, the KVs had two choices as how to deal with this requirement: First, 
raise contributions adequately and directly invest net surpluses in interest-
bearing assets to pre-fund pension liabilities; or, second, to pay annual contri-
butions to a reinsurance fund, created for this purpose, exactly to (half) the 
amount of the present value of all pensions granted in 1908 or later; the rein-
surance organization would then have step by step transferred back to a KV the 
amount of pension payment annually required. In fact, both alternatives were 
economically nearly equivalent regarding the amount of contributions to be 
additionally charged. In the second case, though, KVs would not have invested 
on their own, but would have outsourced part of their investment decisions and 
asset management. So, in case a KV decided to join this reinsurance fund and 
had granted at least one pension in 1908, we find a reinsurance deposit report-
ed.9 
                                                             
8  An example seems helpful here. Imagine a KV at the beginning of 1908 consisting of exactly 
three members, namely Friedrich, Wilhelm, and Otto. Assume Otto became invalid in 1907 
and Wilhelm became invalid, and eligible for an invalidity pension, right at the beginning of 
1908, while Friedrich would regularly work and contribute over that year. Further assume 
the KV expected Wilhelm to live for another 15 years, thus until the end of 1923, and Otto 
at least to survive 1908. According to the new regulations, the KV had to specify Friedrich’s 
contributions due in 1908 such that they would exactly cover current expenditures on Ot-
to’s pension in 1908 (i.e., regardless of how long he might still live) and half of all expected 
expenditures on Wilhelm’s pension over the period 1908-1923 (i.e., the pension’s present 
value discounted to the beginning of 1908). Although this example does not include survi-
vors, their pensions were to be pre-funded in the same fashion, albeit for their full amount. 
Only in the case that a miner had been a member in more than one KV was his pension to 
be prefunded in full as well.  
9  Originally the reinsurance organization was named Knappschaftliche Rückversicherungsan-
stalt a.G. Charlottenburg, but re-named Knappschaftlicher Rückversicherungsverband in 
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Finally, the liability statement is also rather undifferentiated. A KV might 
have run up mortgages on its immovable property (L1) or took out other loans 
(L2). However, the frequency of claiming liabilities was rather low, too.  
2.1.3  Membership Balance 
All in all, the statement on membership composition occupies most of the 
space in the statistics.10 I think it is appropriate here to distinguish “member-
ship stock quantities” (“MSQ”), as measured at a particular point in time (ei-
ther the first of January, or the 31st of December), from “membership flow 
quantities” (“MFQ”), as measured by cumulating incidences over the whole 
year such as deaths by membership category. As with the KVs’ profit and loss 
statement and asset balance, documented membership information shows some 
inconsistencies.  
Table 3 displays membership information by four categories of stock quanti-
ties on the left-hand side – overall contributors, established contributors, unes-
tablished contributors, and pensioners – and by seven flow quantities on the 
right-hand side – inflow of overall contributors, outflow of overall contributors, 
outflow of established contributors, outflow of unestablished contributors, 
inflow of pensioners, outflow of pensioners, and the number of claimed sick 
days. 
Reported, for example, are such stock quantities as the number of contribu-
tors (established, unestablished, and, consequently, overall) by subsector (MSQ 
1.2, MSQ 2.2, and MSQ 3.2), enabling us to assess the production structure 
underlying each KV, or the number of established and, respectively, overall 
contributors by age-group (MSQ 1.3, MSQ 2.3, and MSQ 2.5), enabling us to 
derive the age structure of KVs. Together with age-related data on pensioners, 
such as age-group sizes (MSQ 4.6, MSQ 4.7, and MSQ 4.8) or information on 
the average pension duration and effective age at retirement (MSQ 4.15, MSQ 
4.16, and MSQ 4.17), it is definitely possible to assess the KVs’ experience 
with aging. It is a bit uncomfortable, though, that age-group sizes were not 
reported consistently over time; note the changes of the age categories from 
1888 to 1889 and from 1907 to 1908. 
                                                                                                                                
1916. It was also in that year that membership became compulsory for all Prussian KVs. The 
reinsurance organization was shut down in 1923 eventually, when the Reichsknappschaft 
was installed by merging all remaining German KVs into one national social insurance fund.  
10  Not displayed in the following is the statement on personnel. Each KV was run by its own 
board consisting half and half of miners’ and employers’ representatives. Besides, the board 
was supported by a number of the so-called Elders, respectable people recruited from both 
the working membership and retirees, fulfilling honorary tasks such as controlling the sick 
or keeping membership lists up-to-date. Consequently, the statistics reports the number of 
board members and Elders, but also the number of KV physicians, orderlies, administrative 
staff, and an unspecified rest. Since 1908, we also get to know the number of pharmacists, 
and the administrative staff is differentiated from then on in clerks and actuaries. 
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Table 3: Membership Information 
Membership stock quantities Membership flow quantities 
(MSQ1) Overall contributors (MFQ 1) Inflow of contributors  
(MSQ1.1) Number (1861/1920) (MFQ 1.1) Established ones (1861/1907) 
(MSQ1.2) Number by subsector (1908/20; hard 
coal, brown coal, iron ore, miscellaneous ores, 
halite, stones, steelworks, zinc/ lead/ copper/ 
silver ore processing, alum and vitriol pro-
cessing, tar and paraffin processing, salines)  
(MFQ 1.2) Unestablished ones (1861/88) 
(MSQ1.3) Number by nine age-groups (1908/20; 
under 20, 21-25, 26-30, 31-35, 36-40, 41-50, 
51-60, 61-70, 71 and older) 
(MFQ 1.3) Overall contributorsa (1861/1920; 
thereof acknowledgement fee payers over 
1908/20) 
(MSQ 1.4) Number of acknowledgement fee 
payersa (1908/20; thereof participants in war 
over 1914/19) 
(MFQ 1.4) Sick membersb (1861/1920; due to 
accident and due to other reason) 
(MSQ 1.5) Number of participants in war 
(1914/19) (MFQ 2) Outflow of contributors 
(MSQ 1.6) Number of sick membersb (1908/20) 
(MFQ 2.1) Because of having become eligible 
for invaliditya (1908/20; thereof due to work 
accident and, for 1914/19, due to war) 
(MSQ 2) Established contributors 
MFQ 2.2) Overall deathsa (1908/20; thereof 
due to work accident and, for 1914/19, due to 
war)  
(MSQ 2.1) Overall number (1861/1907) (MFQ 2.3) Outflows for other reasons
a 
(1908/20) 
(MSQ 2.2) Number by subsector (1861/1907; 
hard coal, brown coal, iron ore, miscellaneous 
ores, halite, stones, steel-works, zinc/ lead/ 
copper/ silver ore processing, alum and vitriol 
processing, tar and paraffin processing, salines)  
(MFQ 2.4) Outflow of acknowledgement fee 
payersa (1908/20; eligible for invalidity, death, 
other reasons) 
(MSQ 2.3) Number by six age-groups (1867/88; 
under 16, 16-25, 26-35, 36-45, 46-55, 56 and 
older) 
(MFQ 2.5) Outflow of sick membersb 
(1861/1920; due to death, due to recovery, 
and due to other reason 
(MSQ 2.4) Number of suspended members 
(1889/1907) (MFQ 3) Outflow of established contributors 
(MSQ 2.5) Number by ten age-groups 
(1889/1907; under 16, 16-20, 21-25, 26-30, 31-
35, 36-40, 41-45, 46-50, 51-55, 56 and older) 
(MFQ 3.1) Eligible for invalidity (1861/1907)  
(MSQ 2.6) Number of sick members (1861/1907) (MFQ 3.2) Discharges from membership (1861/1907) 
(MSQ 3) Unestablished contributors  (MFQ 3.3) Deaths (1861/1907; thereof by work accident) 
(MSQ 3.1) Number (1861/1907) 
(MFQ 3.4) Deaths by six age-group (1867/88; 
under 16, 16-25, 26-35, 36-45, 46-55, 56 and 
older) 
(MSQ 3.2) Number by subsector (1861/1907; 
hard coal, brown coal, iron ore, miscellaneous 
ores, halite, stones, steel-works, zinc/ lead/ 
copper/ silver ore processing, alum and vitriol 
processing, tar and paraffin processing, salines) 
(MFQ 3.5) Deaths by ten age-groupsa 
(1889/1920; under 16, 16-20, 21-25, 26-30, 
31-35, 36-40, 41-45, 46-50, 51-55, 56 and 
older) 
(MSQ 3.3) Number of sick members (1861/1907) (MFQ 4) Outflow of unestablished contribu-tors 
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Table 3 continued… 
(MSQ 4) Pensioners (MFQ 4.1) Discharges from membership (1861/88) 
(MSQ 4.1) Number of invalids (1861/1907; for 
both full- and semi-invalids) (MFQ 4.2) Eligible for invalidity (1861/1907)  
(MSQ 4.2) Number of overall invalidsa (1908/20; 
thereof invalid due to work accident and, for 
1914-1919, due to war) 
(MFQ 4.3) Deaths (1861/1907; thereof by 
work accident) 
(MSQ 4.3) Number of widowsa (1861/1920) (MFQ 5) New applications to pensioner status 
(MSQ 4.4) Number of orphansa (1861/19020; for 
both fatherless and mother- and father-less) 
(MFQ 5.1) Invalids from established member-
ship (1861/1907; for both full- and semi-
invalidity) 
(MSQ 4.5) Average age at becoming eligible for 
invaliditya (1861/1920; for both full- and semi-
invalidity) 
(MFQ 5.2) Invalids from unestablished mem-
bership (1861/1907; for both full and semi-
invalidity) 
(MSQ 4.6) Number of invalids by nine age-
groupsa (1867/1920; under 30, 31-35, 36-40, 
41-45, 46-50, 51-55, 56-60, 61-65, 66 and 
older; for both full- and semi-invalids) 
(MFQ 5.3) Invalids due to accident (1908/20) 
and, for 1914/19, due to wara 
(MSQ 4.7) Number of widows by ten age-groups 
(1867/1907; under 20, 21-25, 26-30, 31-35, 36-
40, 41-45, 46-50, 51-55, 56-60, 61 and older) 
(MFQ 5.4) Widowsa (1861/1920; for 1914/19, 
due to war) 
(MSQ 4.8) Number of widows by nine age-
groupsa (1908/20; under 26, 26-30, 31-35, 36-
40, 41-45, 46-50, 51-55, 56-60, 61 and older) 
(MFQ 5.5) Orphansa (1861/1920; for both 
fatherless and mother- and fatherless; for 
1914/19, due to war) 
(MSQ 4.9) Orphans receiving education support 
(1867/1907)  
(MFQ 5.6) Invalids by nine age-groupsa 
(1868/1920; under 30, 31-35, 36-40, 41-45, 
46-50, 51-55, 56-60, 61-65, 66 and older; for 
both full- and semi-invalids) 
(MSQ 4.10) Invalids receiving an accident 
pension from the Knappschafts-
Berufsgenossenschaft (1889/1907; for both full- 
and semi-invalids) 
(MFQ 5.7) Widows by ten age-groupsa 
(1867/1920; (under 20, 21-25, 26-30, 31-35, 
36-40, 41-45, 46-50, 51-55, 56-60, 61 and 
older) 
(MSQ 4.11) Widows receiving an accident 
pension from the Knappschafts-
Berufsgenossenschaft (1899/1907) 
(MFQ 6) Outflows of pensioners 
(MSQ 4.12) Orphans receiving an accident 
pension from the Knappschafts- Berufsgenos-
senschaft (1889/1907)  
(MFQ 6.1) Deaths of orphans (1861/66) 
(MSQ 4.13) Average length of service at the 
time of becoming eligible for invaliditya 
(1900/20; for both full- and semi-invalidity)  
(MFQ 6.2) Discharges of orphans because of 
having reached the age of fourteena 
(1861/66; 1908/20) 
(MSQ 4.14) Average length of service among 
inflowing widows’ husbandsa (1900/20)  
(MFQ 6.3) Deaths of invalidsa (1861/1907: for 
both full- and semi-invalidity; 1908/20: due 
to accident, and, for 1914/19, due to war) 
(MSQ 4.15) Average pension duration among 
those invalids that died over the course of the 
yeara (1900/20; for both full- and semi-
invalidity)  
(MFQ 6.4) Outflow of invalids for other 
reasons (1861/1907; for both full- and semi-
invalidity) 
(MSQ 4.16) Average pension duration among 
those widows that died over the course of the 
yeara (1900/20)  
(MFQ 6.5) Invalids re-integrated into working 
membershipa (1908/20) 
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Table 3 continued… 
(MSQ 4.17) Average biological age among 
inflowing invalidsa (1868/1920) 
(MFQ 6.6) Deaths of widowsa (1861/1920; for 
1914/19, due to war) 
(MSQ 4.18) Average biological age among re-
integrated invalidsa (1908/20) 
(MFQ 6.7) Outflow of widows because of 
remarriagea (1861/1920) 
(MSQ 4.19) Average pension duration among 
re-integrated invalidsa (1908/20)  
(MFQ 6.8) Outflow of widows due to other 
reasona (1908/20) 
(MSQ 4.20) Average biological age among the 
stock of widowsa (1908/20) (MFQ 6.9) Outflows of Orphans (1861/1907) 
(MSQ 4.21) Average biological age among 
inflowing widowsa (1908/20) (MFQ 6.10) Deaths of orphans
a (1908/20) 
 
(MFQ 6.11) Deaths of invalids by nine age-
groupsa (1867/1907; under 30, 30-35, 36-40, 
41-45, 46-50, 51-55, 56-60, 61-65, 66 and 
older; for both full- and semi-invalidity) 
 (MFQ 7) Claimed sick days  
 
(MFQ 7.1) Number of sick days established 
miners took off (1861/1907; reimbursed with 
sick pay or physician’s cost only) 
 
(MFQ 7.2) Number of sick days unestablished 
miners took off (1861/1907; reimbursed with 
sick pay or physician’s cost only) 
 (MFQ 7.3) Through sick pay while staying at homeb (1908/20) 
 (MFQ 7.4) Through sick pay while cured at hospitalb (1908/20) 
 (MFQ 7.5) Without sick pay while cured at hospitalb (1908/20) 
Notes: Overall numbers of contributors and pensioners are reported by January 1st and De-
cember 31st. All other stock quantities measured by 31st December. Regarding both estab-
lished and unestablished working members, the statistics made, until 1889, a distinction be-
tween fully contributing members and those who were suspended. A superscript “a” denotes 
items only relevant, after 1907, regarding the pension insurance section. A superscript “b” 
denotes items only relevant, after 1907, regarding the sickness insurance section. After 1908, 
the KV statistics reports working members as well as invalids by sex. 
Sources: See text. 
 
As the number of reported variables shows, the degree of detail of the state-
ment on flow quantities is even higher. For example, the statistics generally 
specify outflows of working members as caused (i) by death – and whether 
death was caused by accident or disease (and, for the period 1914-1919, by 
participation in war) –, (ii) by having become eligible for an invalidity pension, 
or (iii) by another reason; actually, the latter “catch-the-rest” category mainly 
accounted for those contributors that left their KV to join another one, or to 
quit the mining sector forever. Outflows of invalids were caused by death, of 
course, or by re-integration into working membership; the frequency of re-
integrations was, however, very low. Besides death, widows would also have 
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quit membership if they re-married. Finally, orphans were supported with a 
pension until the age of fourteen.11  
Taking into account that some KVs survived over the full period of 1861-
1920, but others ceased operation sometime in between or came into operation 
only sometime after 1861, there are 4,450 “KV years” to be observed overall. 
2.2  Other Important Statistics: Bavaria and Saxony 
Bureaucracies in Bavaria and Saxony were also engaged in compiling data on 
the KVs there. First, there is the Bavarian KV statistics, or Statistik der 
Knappschaftsvereine im bayerischen Staate, which is to the best of my 
knowledge only available from 1871 on (Oberbergamt München 1871-1921). 
Thus, it was started to be issued two years after the Bavarian mining reform. 
All in all, the Bavarian KV statistics document the operation of all the 56 
different KVs that operated in the period 1871-1920 in a way quite similar to 
what Prussians did. KVs may be ordered by certain mining administration 
regions (Berginspektionsbezirke in this case) as well, namely Bayreuth, Mu-
nich, Regensburg (the latter dissolved in 1882), and Zweibrücken. In fact, 
complementing a data set on Prussian KVs with information on Bavarian ones 
would add additional 1,639 observable KV years per variable. 
Finally, the Saxon KV statistics was published as part of the Jahrbuch für 
den Berg- und Hütten-Mann (Königliches Finanzministerium Sachsen 1870-
1872) or, respectively, the Jahrbuch für das Berg- und Hüttenwesen im König-
reiche Sachsen (Königliches Finanzministerium Sachsen 1873-1921). The 
1870 volume actually reports data on the year 1868 when the Saxons conducted 
their own mining reform including a reform of KV regulations.12  
In all, 93 different KVs were in operation over the full period 1868-1920 or, 
at least, for some years or decades yielding 1,097 observable KV years.13 In 
contrast to Prussian and Bavarian KV regulation, Saxony strictly separated into 
pension funds and sickness societies. From the perspective of the Saxon KV 
statistics, a KV was a fund that insured against invalidity and survivorship. 
Consequently, societies insuring miners against sickness were not counted as a 
Knappschaft. Beyond that, Saxon KVs were strictly separated by product (hard 
coal, brown coal, and ores).14  
                                                             
11  Note that provision for surviving dependants became part of Bismarckian worker insurance 
not before 1911.  
12  It is possible to obtain some data on Saxon KVs for several decades prior to 1868. The de-
gree of informational detail, however, increased notably with the first post-reform volume.  
13  This rather low number of observable KV years is due to the fact that all but two KVs were 
merged into one large pension fund in 1890, the Allgemeine Knappschafts-Pensionskasse 
Sachsen. 
14  Bavarians and Prussians did not know such a distinction by rights. 
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3.  Application: The Knappschaften’s Aging Memberships 
3.1  Historical Evidence on Aging 
As the preceding survey has shown, a lot of information that may be used to 
reconstruct the KVs’ social insurance operations in a quite informative way and 
to generalize on issues related to the welfare state is provided. Now I make use 
of part of the data on Prussian KVs to provide some historical evidence on a 
hitherto much debated question in the economics: How does population aging 
affect the finances of pay-as-you-go financed old-age programs? The least that 
an economic historian, as I am one, can contribute to answer this question is to 
“point a spotlight” at our past experience and to trace if people, say, in the late 
nineteenth century, already saw themselves confronted with problems of which 
one may think that they are something very special to today’s advanced, ma-
tured welfare states. Provided people already felt so a hundred or more years 
ago, how did they cope with the challenges that they perceived were emerging?  
The KVs, and the contemporary observers discussing their affairs, already 
saw themselves confronted with a challenge very similar, in the end, to one 
modern pay-as-you-go social insurance has been dealing with: increasingly 
more old, retired people have become economically dependent on the transfers 
financed by a relatively shrinking working population – a population, though, 
that might have produced with constantly rising productivity. 
Yet, at first glance, there is a big difference between the way KVs operated 
and the way modern old-age programs do: KVs did not explicitly insure old-
age. Theirs was to insurance against invalidity, which could have occurred at 
any a miner’s age, but for which a KV nonetheless paid until the invalid’s 
death (and beyond, as the existence of survivors’ benefits show). In fact, the 
mental concept of a retirement phase naturally following working life after 
passing the age of 60 or 65 had not yet made its way in the nineteenth and early 
twentieth century (Conrad 1994, 12; Göckenjan and Hansen 1993, 731). Actu-
ally, to bring in KVs as a “historical laboratory” requires emphasizing the 
social dimension of population aging over the pure biological dimension.15 The 
old-age dependency ratio, a measure often applied in aging-related investiga-
tions, reflects this dual view pretty well. For, on the one hand, it relates the 
number of people below an assumed threshold age of 60 or 65 to people above 
that age and, on the other hand, it relates the number of working people to the 
number of retired people, thereby implicitly highlighting the redistributive 
relationship between both parties. 
                                                             
15  The distinction into “biological” and “social” ageing has been advocated by, for example, 
Bourdieu and Kesztenbaum (2007), 185. 
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Fortunately, we can construct four simple measures from the KV statistics 
that are quite similar to the old-age dependency ratio, namely the invalids-to-
contributors ratio (ICR), the survivors-to-contributors ratio (SCR), and both 
ratios’ respective reciprocals, the invalids-support ratio (ISR) and the survi-
vors-support ratio (SSR).  
Let us begin with the former two ratios. Table 4 reports both measures as 
median values over the N KVs that were operating over the respective periods. 
I split the universe of Prussian KVs into two samples, namely “stagnant” and 
“dynamic” ones. A KV was ascribed to the former sample if it showed a stag-
nating, or shrinking, contributor base over the period 1861-1920 (i.e., an aver-
age geometric growth rate of working membership < 0); it was ascribed to the 
latter if its contributor base grew positively in the long-term (i.e., by an average 
geometric growth rate > 0). The reason as to why this distinction makes sense 
is the following: Due to the fact that a KV was either responsible for miners of 
a particular mining company or, instead, for a particular insurance area (quite 
similar to territorial monopolies), expansion of the working, and contributing, 
membership was limited by the growth opportunities that the particular mining 
company, or the companies in the KV’s area, faced. If mining had thrived and 
local resource deposits had still been rich, labor input would have been in-
creased, and so would have had a KV’s working membership; in contrast, if 
mining had stagnated, because local resource deposits were nearly exhausted 
(either technically or economically), labor input would have stagnated, and so 
would have had a KV’s working membership. So, while stagnation of mining 
activities would have certainly resulted in increasing economic dependency of 
ever more pensioners on ever fewer contributors, KVs in prospering areas, and 
with expanding working memberships, might not have felt rising pressure on 
finances at all. We have to control for this effect.  
Yet, as we can infer from Table 4, not only did stagnant KVs experience a 
rising ICR and a rising SCR, but also did dynamic ones, though not to the same 
extent. For example, stagnant KVs’ median burden with invalidity pensioners 
in the period 1861/1865 was 0.02 invalids per contributor (or, when multiplied 
with one hundred, two invalids per 100 contributors). As of around 1913, the 
median burden had increased to 0.19 invalids per contributor (or 19 per 100). 
Dynamic KVs obviously faced a slower rising burden with pensioners, but 
long-term expansion of working membership was, in itself, no guarantee for 
not experiencing aging. As the standard deviation shows, there was a consider-
able range of burdens with pensioners to be observed. One might wonder how, 
say, the median burden displayed in Table 4 compares to that of systems of the 
second half of the twentieth century. For German pension insurance, for exam-
ple, we can calculate that there were 39 pensioners per 100 contributors in 1993 
and 46 in 2006 (Deutsche Rentenversicherung Bund 2008, 14, 169). So, sum-
ming over the ICR and SCR, stagnant KVs partly exceeded those levels, and 
dynamic KVs were, at least, on the way to arrive at such levels. 
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Table 4: Rising Economic Dependency in the Knappschaften 
Period Stagnant Knappschaften Dynamic Knappschaften 
 N ICR SCR N ICR SCR 
1861/1865 28 0.02   (0.07) 0.08   (0.15) 49 0.03   (0.04) 0.12   (0.14) 
1866/1870 36 0.03   (0.13) 0.13   (0.19) 57 0.03   (0.06) 0.15   (0.13) 
1871/1875 34 0.04   (0.22) 0.17   (0.31) 61 0.04   (0.03) 0.16   (0.12) 
1876/1880 29 0.07   (0.29) 0.23   (0.44) 56 0.05   (0.04) 0.19   (0.12) 
1881/1885 28 0.08   (0.20) 0.25   (0.49) 55 0.05   (0.04) 0.19   (0.11) 
1886/1890 26 0.08   (0.18) 0.28   (0.26) 51 0.06   (0.04) 0.17   (0.11) 
1891/1895 25 0.12   (0.14) 0.30   (0.27) 48 0.06   (0.08) 0.17   (0.16) 
1896/1900 25 0.16   (0.14) 0.35   (0.33) 48 0.07   (0.08) 0.16   (0.15) 
1901/1905 25 0.14   (0.13) 0.32   (0.50) 48 0.07   (0.06) 0.16   (0.08) 
1906/1910 25 0.15   (0.20) 0.35   (0.80) 47 0.09   (0.05) 0.17   (0.09) 
1911/1915 22 0.19   (0.12) 0.32   (0.25) 44 0.10   (0.09) 0.18   (0.14) 
1916/1920 17 0.19   (0.14) 0.29   (0.22) 39 0.09   (0.06) 0.25   (0.11) 
Notes: Displayed per period are the rounded median of average scores and the standard devia-
tion (in brackets); see text for abbreviations. 
Sources: See text. 
 
Figure 1: The “Inverse” Picture – Pensioner Support Ratios 
 
Notes: Displayed per year is the respective median ratio; see text for abbreviations. 
Sources: See text. 
 
We can put the process of rising economic dependency among the KVs in a yet 
even more illustrative way by asking the question the other way around: How 
many working miners were there, on average, to finance one retired miner? To 
answer this question we require information on the support ratio, which is 
simply equal to the inverse of the ICR (or SCR). Graph 1 plots these inverse 
ratios, the median ISR and SSR. What we find is that the number of contribu-
tors ready to support one invalid, or one survivor, notably decreased at the 
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median – regarding stagnant (dynamic) KVs, from 42 (28) contributors per one 
invalid in 1861 to less than five (12) in 1920 and from about 12 (7) contributors 
per one survivor to less than five (four).  
Now one might ask as to whether increases in the ICR/SCR, or decreases in 
the ISR/SSR, might have been compensated by increases in productivity and, 
thus, wages. In other words, would it generally constitute a serious problem at 
all seeing ever less contributors relative to pensioners? This seems to depend 
on whether pensions already granted were adjusted to growth, too. If so, as in 
Germany nowadays, we might doubt that steadily rising productivity is suffi-
cient to solve the problem. However, nineteenth- and early twentieth-century 
KVs, as well as Bismarckian pension insurance, did not know (automatic) 
adjustments of pensions to (i) economic growth (of the mining sector or, re-
spectively, of the whole economy) or (ii) price developments after pensions 
had factually become due. To answer this question in our particular case of 
static pensions, a simple exercise will do: We only need to compare the long-
term growth of wages with the long-term growth rate of the ICR/SCR.16 Wages 
on mining (including salines) can be obtained from Hoffmann (1965, 461). 
Covering the years 1861 to 1913, his series yields a long-term growth rate of 
2.04 percent (1.67 percent over 1867-1913). In contrast, the median ICR 
among stagnant (dynamic) KVs rose by 6.9 (2.3) percent in the long-term; the 
median SCR among stagnant (dynamic) KVs rose by 3.66 (0.32) percent. In 
fact, economic dependency increased faster than wages did.17 
To end this subsection, I provide additional evidence on the biological di-
mension of the KVs’ aging memberships. Therefore I bring in three further 
measures, namely the “average age of invalids”, the “average invalidity pen-
sion duration”, and the “average age at retirement”. Table 5 contains the corre-
sponding information. I concentrate on invalidity pensioners here since there 
were much more costly than survivors, although their number was usually 
lower.  
For each KV the average age of invalids has been calculated as the weighted 
average over age-groups (i.e., variables subsumed under item MSQ 4.6) assum-
ing that all invalids in an age-group were exactly of mid-group age. Evidence 
suggests that the median average age increased in the long-term for both stag-
nant and dynamic KVs – from 59 to 65 in the former case and from 57 to 59 in 
the latter – indirectly pointing to a rise in life expectancy.  
                                                             
16  That KVs granted miners Otto and Wilhelm static pensions, which nominally remained 
unadjusted over their retirement period, should not be confused with their ability to raise 
Friedrich’s pension before it actually became due.   
17  Throughout this article, the empirical extent of economic dependency among KVs has to be 
understood as net of countermeasures that would increase the contributor base relative to 
the amount of pensioners, e.g., sharpening eligibility rules over time, which would have re-
duced the share of accepted invalids in total applicants. Unfortunately, we cannot measure 
this effect on the basis of the statistics.   
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Table 5: Measuring the “Biological Side” of Aging 
Period Stagnant Knappschaften Dynamic Knappschaften 
 Average 
age of 
invalids 
Average 
invalidity 
pension 
duration 
Average age 
at  
retirement 
Average 
age of 
invalids 
Average 
invalidity 
pension 
duration 
Average age 
at  
retirement 
1867/1870 59   (9) - 53    (8) 57   (7) - 51    (8) 
1871/1875 59   (6) - 56    (7) 56   (6) - 52    (8) 
1876/1880 58   (6) - 53    (8) 56   (5) - 51    (7) 
1881/1885 59   (6) - 54    (8) 56   (6) - 52    (7) 
1886/1890 60   (6) - 54    (7) 57   (5) - 52    (8) 
1891/1895 61   (6) - 55    (8) 58   (5) - 53    (7) 
1896/1900 63   (5) - 55    (3) 58   (5) - 53    (7) 
1901/1905 63   (5) 7.5    (4.9) 54    (8) 58   (4) 8.0   (4.9) 53    (7) 
1906/1910 62   (5) 9.0    (6.1) 55    (7) 59   (4) 8.5   (3.5) 54    (6) 
1911/1915 63   (4) 10.0   (6.3) 56    (8) 59   (4) 9.3   (3.8) 54    (6) 
1916/1920 65   (4) 12.4   (5.0) 56    (7) 59   (4) 9.9   (4.0) 54    (6) 
Notes: Displayed per period is the rounded median of average scores and the standard devia-
tion (in brackets). 
Sources: See text. 
 
The second measure is directly obtainable from the KV statistics (MSQ 4.15) 
and informs us about for how many years an invalid who died over the course 
of year t had received his invalidity pension. Unfortunately, we only have the 
necessary data from 1900 onwards. For stagnant KVs, as for dynamic ones, the 
median average pension duration rose over the twenty years we can observe, by 
nearly five years and, respectively, two years. But do these increases really 
reflect rising life expectancy or do they simply reflect a decreasing effective 
retirement age? In order to answer this question we have to take a look at 
measure three, which is the median average age at retirement among all stag-
nant and, respectively, dynamic KVs. That the average pension duration be-
came longer and longer could have appeared simply because miners became 
invalid earlier than before, for example, due to adverse incentives to retire 
earlier or due to the production environment. But, rather, data show that the 
average age at retirement increased over 1900-1920, which is a clear hint at 
rising life expectancy. There are two main explanations for this trend. First, 
technological progress made mining less perilous and lethally such that many 
miners who would once have died before they could be retired, actually came 
to see retirement; and, second, medical-technological progress, in particular, 
making treatment of those involved in accidents and of those suffering from 
diseases like the black lung more effective such that death was postponed.  
3.2  Contribution Rates and Generosity under Pressure 
Recall that, faster in the period under observation, economic dependency grew 
than wages. Yet, one might ask as to whether KVs were able to compensate for 
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growth of wages lagging behind by cutting the amount of benefits receivable 
before they actually were granted. This question directly touches on the ques-
tion of how the KVs reacted to increasing financial pressure. I will assess this 
question by making use of one crucial identity: In a pay-as-you-go pension 
system the contribution rate (CR) is equal to the product of the pensioners-to-
contributors ratio and the pension level; the latter is the ratio of the average 
pension to the average wage in the population of insurants and, thus, deter-
mines the system’s average income replacement standard. Having estimates of 
the ICR and SCR at hand, as well as of the replacement rate, the contribution 
rate follows as a residual. According to Disney (2004, 274), we might call this 
contribution rate more accurately the “equilibrium contribution rate”, because 
miscellaneous costs, miscellaneous revenues, and reserves are assumed to be 
zero. In comparison, we could estimate the contribution rate by referencing the 
observable amount of contributions paid per capita against wage, regardless of 
having estimates of the ICR, SCR and replacement rates at hand or not. The 
following exercise is built around the concept of equilibrium contribution rates. 
Let us begin with the KVs’ generosity. For the moment, is it sufficient to 
have a look at how generous KVs were at the start of their existence as insur-
ers, thus in the cross-section of 1861. To obtain KV-level estimates of pension 
levels regarding invalidity, widows’ and orphans’ pensions, we need to divide 
the average pension (e.g., E1.2 / MSQ 4.1 and, respectively, E1.2 / MSQ 4.2), 
year by year, by the average wage in the mining sector.18 I again use Hoff-
mann’s series on wages in the mining sector as well as his series on wages in 
metal production for those KVs that mainly insured metalworkers. Table 6 
depicts generosity assessed this way. Obviously, KVs that would experience 
stagnation later on were much more generous, at the median, regarding provi-
sion for invalidity than were those that would prosper in the long-term. Possi-
bly, stagnant KVs were simply too optimistic about their business prospects. A 
pension level, or replacement rate, of 28.5 percent was definitely not a bad deal 
for the time. Survivors’ pensions were naturally lower.  
Table 6: Generosity in the Cross-Section of 1861 
Median pension level stagnant KVs Median pension level dynamic KVs 
(N = 26) (N = 45) 
Invalids’ 
pensions 
Widows’ 
pensions 
Orphans’ 
pensions 
Invalids’ 
pensions 
Widows’ 
pensions 
Orphans’ 
pensions 
   28.5 %    9.0 %    4.1 %    18.7 %    9.4 %    3.2 % 
(11.7) (5.2) (2.8) (10.7) (5.8) (1.5) 
Notes: Standard deviation in brackets. 
Sources: See text. 
 
                                                             
18  According to Sprenger (1991, 187), one thaler (1861-1874) has been converted into three 
marks.  
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Against the background of the basic identity mentioned above, the KVs could 
principally pursue three different strategies to adjust their finances. The first is 
not assessable with the available data, namely to either tighten eligibility crite-
ria ruling whom invalidity status would be granted or soften eligibility criteria 
ruling which contributor would enter established membership and pay a contri-
bution that would be higher than that among unestablished miners.19 The sec-
ond and third ways, namely to adjust contributions upwards or generosity 
downwards, are indeed assessable. It seems reasonable to build a straightfor-
ward counterfactual scenario by asking how strongly the contribution rate, say, 
for the KV pressed with aging according to the median economic dependency 
scenario displayed in Table 4, would have had to rise if the pension level was 
to be hold constant over 1861-1913 at the 1861-levels.20 
Graph 2: Counterfactual Equilibrium Pension Contribution Rates in the 
“Median Burden” Scenario  
 
Notes: Pension levels hold constant at the level of 1861. 
Sources: See text. 
 
Graph 2 visualizes how the median equilibrium contribution rates would have 
had to rise for stagnant and dynamic KVs to be able to provide an invalidity 
pension level of 28.5 and, respectively, 18.7 percent over the whole period. 
Stagnant KVs had started with an equilibrium contribution rate less than 0.18 
percent, and dynamic ones with 0.5 percent. Whatever the starting conditions, 
KVs would have seen a contribution rate of around six and 1.8 percent in 1913, 
                                                             
19  Of course, softening criteria for achieving established status now meant to have to provide 
for more costly pensioners later.  
20  I restrict the following exercise to the years 1861-1913, because there is a gap in Hoff-
mann’s series until 1923. 
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respectively, had they maintained equilibrium while holding generosity with 
regard to invalidity constant. The counterfactual “total pension contribution 
rate” accounting for survivors’ pensions, too, would have grown even faster, up 
to around eight and three percent, respectively. 21 The fact that a KV might 
have been on a positive growth trajectory definitely dampened the financial 
consequences of rising economic dependency. 
Graph 3:  Actual Equilibrium Pension Contribution Rates in the “Median 
Burden” Scenario 
 
Notes: Pension levels no longer kept constant. 
Sources: See text. 
 
The counterfactual as a first step is necessary in order to judge the time path of 
the actual equilibrium contribution rate adequately. Now the restriction of 
constant 1861 pension levels will be lifted. Graph 3 depicts actual equilibrium 
contribution rates inclusive of historical adjustments made via the generosity 
channel. As was to be expected, contribution rates did rise as a rule, but not as 
fast as they did in the counterfactual scenario. The difference between counter-
factual contribution rates on the one hand and actual contribution rates on the 
other reflects the extent to which the welfare level was reduced in order to take 
financial pressure off workers.  
What is still to do is to quantify the level of generosity at which the KVs ar-
rived. Blinding out the extraordinary years of war and undisguised inflation, 
Table 7 shows that the median invalidity pension level among stagnant KVs 
eventually declined by approximately two-thirds, to just less than 11 percent; 
the pension level with regard to survivors was similarly adjusted downwards. 
  
                                                             
21  Note that these contribution rates do not account for non-pension cost. 
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Table 7: Generosity at the Onset of War (1911/13) 
Median pension level stagnant KVs Median pension level dynamic KVs 
(N = 22) (N = 44) 
Invalids’ 
pensions 
Widows’ 
pensions 
Orphans’ 
pensions 
Invalids’ 
pensions 
Widows’ 
pensions 
Orphans’ 
pensions 
10.6 % 5.3 % 1.8 % 17.7 % 9.1 % 2.8 % 
(6.7) (2.6) (0.8) (9.3) (6.6) (1.6) 
Notes: Standard deviation in brackets. 
Sources: See text. 
 
At first glance, it might look quite positive that dynamic KVs, due to the eco-
nomic environment they were embedded in, seemingly managed to sustain the 
generosity levels at which they once had started. In reality, though, dynamic 
KVs were not really better off. Figuratively spoken, they all had, at some point 
in time, to backpedal quite considerably to a level of generosity that they per-
ceived to be sustainable. Note that, as of the late 1880s, they already had ar-
rived at median pension levels of about 25 percent, 11 percent, and 3.5 percent, 
respectively. This observation suggests that the advantage of steadily growing 
KVs over steadily shrinking funds in mastering the “aging challenge” was not 
that big after all. 
4.  Concluding Remarks 
The KVs formed a small part of the many mutual relief societies operating in 
Germany in the nineteenth and early twentieth century. Miners, who had access 
through their KVs to a comprehensive package of different kinds of benefits 
addressing quite different risks, seem to have been privileged compared to 
other industrial workers. They relied upon their own insurance system that 
would later co-exist with Reich insurance. What is more, the KVs are statisti-
cally quite well documented enabling us to reconstruct much of their historical 
experience and, thereby, to shed light on aging as a major challenge of the 
modern (Bismarckian-style) welfare state.  
Usually, rising life expectancy and aging are analytically assessed for an 
economy’s entire population, thus on the macro-level. Yet, there is also a mi-
cro-level on which these issues may be assessed; the KVs provide such a mi-
cro-level perspective. Their historical experience illuminates the fundamental 
tension in a maturing pay-as-you-go pension system between allowing retired 
members to benefit from a preferably high welfare level and burdening financi-
ers at the same time with a still acceptable load of contributions. Against the 
background of this trade-off between the degree of generosity and the degree of 
revenue extraction, KVs sooner or later decided to cut generosity, which took 
off some pressure of the contribution rates, but which adversely affected insur-
ants’ welfare position. Alone that the KVs had the possibility to make quite 
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strong use of lowering the pension levels, draws our attention to the still differ-
ent situation today. Look at Germany, for example, where the (average) income 
replacement standard of old-age insurance still remains untouched. However, 
since the standard is based on political decisions, there is no true guarantee that 
it will remain untouched in the future. The empirical exercise is not meant to 
make a normative statement on whether maintaining a high average pension 
level is still acceptable or not. Rather it is intended to document the trade-off’s 
importance then and now.   
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